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FOREWORD
William V Dorsaneo, III*
HE publication of this edition of SMU Law Review marks the twenty-
seventh time that an Annual Survey of Texas Law has been published
by a law review at Southern Methodist University. During this pe-
riod of operation under the Journal's former name, Southwestern Law Jour-
nal, SMU has been privileged to publish many manuscripts authored by
leading legal citizens whose work has been cited with regularity by the judi-
ciary. Survey articles written by Dean Page Keeton, Professor Joseph W.
McKnight, Dean A.J. Thomas and Dean W. Frank Newton have been cited
more than sixty times in judicial opinions.
A recently published study noted that the Survey has accounted for ap-
proximately two-thirds of all citations to the Southwestern Law Journal by
state courts and more than one-half of all citations to the Southwestern Law
Journal by all courts in reported opinions.' This solid record has made a
major contribution toward making the Southwestern Law Journal the second
most often cited law journal published in Texas during this century. 2
Although this is the first time that a Survey will be published under the new
name, SMU Law Review, it is anticipated that this tradition of excellent ser-
vice to the bench and bar will continue. This is also the first time that a
foreword has been included in the Survey. Its purpose is to identify some of
the identifiable trends in the development of Texas jurisprudence in an effort
to make the more detailed articles in the Survey even more useful as resource
tools for the bench and bar. Of course, even if time and space limtations
would permit, no one can really accomplish this task on every subject cov-
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law. B.A., 1967, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1970, University of Texas. A member of Phi Beta Kappa, Grand
Chancellor of the Order of Chancellors, and a member of the Order of the Coif. Professor
Dorsaneo was a litigation specialist in Dallas after graduation from law school. He is principal
author of the 20 volume TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE published by Matthew Bender and the co-
author of the TEXAS PRE-TRIAL LITIGATION, TEXAS TRIAL & APPELLATE PRACTICE, and
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CIVIL PROCEDURE casebooks. Professor Dorsaneo is also a co-
author and general editor of a 5 volume trial practice treatise entitled THE TEXAS CIVIL
TRIAL GUIDE, as well as a commentator for monthly publications such as the TEXAS TORTS
UPDATE and BAD FAITH LAW UPDATE. He is a frequent teacher on Texas procedure at
continuing legal education seminars and is a regular on the advanced appellate practice pro-
gram presented annually by the State Bar of Texas. He is Board certified in civil appellate law
and is an active member of the Committee on court rules and of the Advisory Committee to
the Texas Supreme Court. Professor Dorsaneo is also the chairperson of a Task Force ap-
pointed by the Texas Supreme Court on Revision of the Rules of Civil Procedure and a mem-
ber of the American Law Institute.
I. Jim Paulsen & James Hambleton, Reviewing the Law Reviews, Texas-Style, 56 TEX.
B.J. 284, 284 (1993).
2. Id. (ranking of citations by state and federal appellate courts).
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ered in the Survey without missing something of real significance that has
happened or that is imminent. Nonetheless, it is my privilege to make this
small contribution.
For at least the last twenty years, the subject of personal injury repara-
tions law and the field of tort law in general has undergone relatively rapid
and pervasive change and evolution. A major trend that has been continued
during this Survey period involves a reexamination of both traditional and
developing tort doctrines, including the relationship between tort and con-
tract law. Building on case law decided during the last Survey period, 3 the
Texas Supreme Court has continued to resolve the "contort" controversy by
limiting the availability of traditional tort theories in commercial settings. A
distillation of current Texas law yields the conclusion that although negli-
gence law has a role to play in the context of cases involving breaches of
contractual obligations, 4 depending primarily on the nature of the claimant's
injury, as a general rule the negligent nonperformance of a contractual obli-
gation causing a direct economic loss 5 is not actionable under a negligence
theory. Even an intentional or a fraudulent failure to perform a contractual
undertaking is not actionable in tort unless the breaching party fraudulently
misrepresented the intention to perform at the time the contract was made. 6
In other words, during this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court has
virtually eliminated the availability of traditional tort doctrine when the na-
ture of the wrong is the breach of a contract. 7 Only fraud in the inducement
remains as a viable theory of recovery under these circumstances.8 Even this
avenue of liability has been narrowed by the Texas Supreme Court decisions
concerning a claimant's proof requirements. In an apparent retreat from
earlier cases, 9 the court has held that not only is a party's failure to perform
a contract, standing alone, no evidence of a party's intent not to perform at
the time the contract was made,10 a party's denial that the promise was
made in the first place is not a sufficient basis for a jury finding that the
promise was fraudulent. I At the same time, the court has indicated that the
3. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1991); Crim Truck &
Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. 1992).
4. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Delanney, 809 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1991).
5. See Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 78 n.1 (Tex. 1977); see
also Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 918
(1966):
Direct economic loss may be said to encompass damage based on insufficient
product value; thus, direct economic loss may be "out of pocket" the difference
in value between what was given and received or "loss of bargain" the difference
between the value of what is received and its value as represented. Direct eco-
nomic loss may also be measured by costs of replacement and repair. Conse-
quential economic loss includes all indirect loss, such as loss of profits resulting
from inability to make use of the defective product.
6. Crim Truck & Tractor Co., 823 S.W.2d at 597.
7. Id. at 597.
8. Id.
9. Spoljaric v. Percival Tours, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex. 1986); see also King v.
Tubb, 551 S.W.2d 436, 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, no writ).
10. Schindler v. Austwell Farmers Coop., 841 S.W.2d 853, 854 (Tex. 1992).
11. T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 259 (Dec. 2, 1992).
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new tort duties of good faith and fair dealing will not be expanded to provide
claimants with new opportunities for imposing liability in the ordinary com-
mercial context.' 2 In a companion development, the common law of negli-
gent misrepresentation has been relegated to a position of relative
insignificance by the court because the measure of recovery is restricted to
the claimant's "out-of pocket" losses and because no recovery of damages
for mental anguish or lost profits is available. ' 3 In fairness, however, it must
be noted that there is no clear indication that an assault will be made on the
recoverability of damages when the claim is grounded on a statutory founda-
tion, including the Deceptive Trade Practices Act. 1 4 Nonetheless, it appears
that in all cases in which lost profits are available, the court has imposed
relatively strict proof requirements. 1 5
In addition to the elimination of mental anguish damages as a compensa-
ble loss in cases of negligent misrepresentation, the court has gone to great
lengths in an attempt to curtail the continuing development of modem tort
concepts allowing claimants to recover for emotional distress. Although the
availability of these damages had appeared to be well-established,' 6 the
court's treatment of the companion tort theories of negligent and intentional
infliction of emotional distress has clearly turned the clock backwards. In a
nutshell, under current Texas law there is no general duty not to inflict rea-
sonably foreseeable emotional distress when physical injury to the claimant
is not reasonably foreseeable.' 7 Furthermore, even though the tort of "out-
rageous conduct" or "intentional infliction of emotional distress" grounded
on the Second Restatement of Torts, section 46 is well recognized by inter-
mediate appellate courts in Texas,' 8 the court has declined to recognize it as
an independent basis for liability.19 As in the commercial context, during
this Survey period in large measure the court has demonstrated a fondness
for traditional principles of liability interpreted almost as narrowly as ex-
isting recent precedent will allow.20 Nonetheless, in several significant re-
spects, traditional impediments to recovery against particular classes of
12. See Crim Truck & Tractor Co., 823 S.W.2d at 596 (franchisor-franchisee relationship
is not a "special relationship" giving rise to a tort duty of good faith and fair dealing); see also
Mims v. Beall, 810 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ) (when standard is
one of fiduciary obligation, any self-dealing is prohibited). But see Dearing, Inc. v. Spiller, 824
S.W.2d 728, 733-34 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) (holder of executive rights in
mineral lease held to same duty as a fiduciary such that any self-dealing is prohibited).
13. Federal Land Bank Ass'n of Tyler v. Sloane, 825 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tex. 1991). "Re-
statement (second) 552B allows for damages suffered in reliance upon negligent misrepresenta-
tion, but not for the failure to obtain the benefit of the bargain." Id. at 443.
14. See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. 1991) (settlement cred-
its applied only after actual damages were trebled); Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d
160 (Tex. 1992) (plaintiff has choice of damage measures in DTPA cases).
15. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 SW.2d 80, 84-86 (Tex. 1992).
16. See St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987).
17. Boyles v. Kerr, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 231 (Dec. 2, 1992).
18. See Tidelands Auto. Club v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
19. Boyles v. Kerr, 36 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 231 (Dec. 2, 1992); see also Diamond Shamrock
Refining v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198, 201-02 (Tex. 1992).
20. See Delaney v. University of Houston, 835 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1992).
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defendants have been eliminated2' or greatly ameliorated. 22
The last developments of real importance in the tort law field concern the
related subjects of settlement and the adjudicative effects of settlement. In
Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling,23 the court attempted to identify and
reconcile the various contribution/settlement schemes that exist under
Texas statutory and common law. 24 The court concluded that the 1917
Contribution Statute applied to the case rather than the Duncan scheme of
pure comparative causation because the case involved an "intentional" tort
not covered by the former comparative negligence statute or by Duncan.25
It is obvious from the opinion that the court's conclusion rested primarily on
a renewed affection for the "one satisfaction" or "credit" rule that had been
rejected, if not abolished, by the court when the Duncan scheme was cre-
ated26 as well as the fact that the "tort reform" statute could not be ap-
plied.27 Nonetheless, the court's opinion raises signifcant questions
concerning the relationship of Chapters 32 and 33 of the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code that will continue to bedevil the bench and bar until it is
determined whether cases like Sterling are covered by the comparative re-
sponsibility statute.28 Finally, the settlement game has also been changed
radically by the elimination of Mary Carter agreements from the legal land-
scape for "those cases in the judicial pipeline where error has been preserved,
and to those actions tried on or after December 2, 1992. ' '29 On balance,
these developments represent an effort to resolve ongoing problems that con-
front tort lawyers on a daily basis. Unfortunately, the ultimate goal of facili-
tating fair settlements under clear guidelines could not be achieved during
the Survey period.
The fields of procedural law and evidence have also been affected consid-
erably by important decisions during the Survey period. The most notable
trends in these subject areas concern the concepts of procedural waiver in
the context of the jury charge and discovery, a reconsideration of the proper
interpretation of the rules of civil procedure governing Texas charge practice
21. Cox v. Thee Evergreen Church, 836 S.W.2d 167, 171 (Tex. 1992).
22. Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. 1992); Aduddell v. Park-
hill, 821 S.W.2d 158, 159 (Tex. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2998 (1992); see also Havner v.
E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1992).
23. 822 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1991).
24. Id. at 2. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 32.001-32.003 (Vernon 1986) (the
1917 Contribution Statute); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001-33.017 (Vernon
1986), amended by, Acts 1987, 70th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 2 § 2.04 (the 1973 Comparative Negli-
gence statute); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 33.001-33.016 (Vernon 1986 & Supp.
1993) (the "tort reform" Comparative Responsibility Statute enacted in 1987); Duncan v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 429 (Tex. 1984) (common law scheme).
25. 822 S.W.2d at 2.
26. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 432-34 (Tex. 1984).
27. The Sterling case was filed before September 2, 1987, the effective date of current
Chapter 33 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.
28. See First Title Co. of Waco v. Garrett, 802 S.W.2d 254, 262-63 (Tex. App.-Waco
1990, writ granted) (writ granted on points concerning entitlement of defendants to credit or
offset for prior recoveries).
29. Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 251 (Tex. 1992).
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in civil cases, and the adoption of a more pragmatic approach to the doctrine
of res judicata.
Any experienced Texas practitioner can attest that Texas appellate courts
have been especially inclined to use waiver principles to resolve disputes that
should be resolved on the merits. Moreover, in a number of important con-
texts, waiver has been imposed even though the trial judge was made fully
cognizant of the complaint, but not in precisely the right form or manner.
This infatuation with technical procedural rules is generally out-of-step with
modem procedural thinking. Fortunately, as a result of a series of recent
Texas Supreme Court decisions there is good reason to anticipate that Texas
courts will begin generally to refrain from using technical procedural re-
quirements as weapons for the insulation of erroneous judgments from
reversal.
Indeed, during this Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court has clearly
disapproved of this method of dispute resolution in one particularly impor-
tant context, preservation of complaints concerning the jury charge, while
ameliorating waiver problems in several others. After surveying the continu-
ing expansion of waiver doctrine and the complex difficulties confronting
counsel in preserving complaints about the jury charge as well as the need
for amendments of the applicable procedural rules, the court appears to have
repudiated the theoretical justification for a number of its prior decisions in
favor of a more congenial approach that fairly places the responsibility upon
the trial judge to work with counsel in developing a proper jury charge.30
Under this approach, the "one test for determining if a party has preserved
error in the jury charge... is whether the party made the trial court aware
of the complaint, timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling."'3'
This welcome change in Texas procedural jurisprudence was accompanied
by a series of "anti-waiver" decisions including opinions allowing counsel to
reasonably explain non-compliance with the requirements for supplementa-
tion of discovery responses, 32 allowing the relaxation of a strict exclusionary
rule as a sanction for noncompliance with the supplementation rules 33 and
rejecting or disapproving of other forms of procedural punishment for tech-
30. State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Tex. 1992);
see also Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. John Carlo Texas, Inc., 843 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. 1992)
(request was "substantially correct despite omission of element of 'good faith' "); cf Keetch v.
Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1992) (complaint about failure to comply with Rule 277's
mandate for broad-form submission waived).
31. 838 S.W.2d at 241. The court also explained that the "more specific requirements of
the rules" should "serve rather than defeat this principle."
32. Smith v. Southwest Feed Yards Ltd., 835 S.W.2d 89, 90-91 (Tex. 1992) (witness'
name was disclosed in answer to a different interrogatory about the case but not in response to
question asking for identification of persons having knowledge of facts); Henry S. Miller Co. v.
Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1992) (undisclosed party witness was deposed and was the
"only individual named party"); Remington Arms Co. v. Canales, 837 S.W.2d 624, 625-626
(Tex. 1992) (good cause shown when response was provided to the same plaintiff's counsel in
another case to identical request); see also Service Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Harbison, 826 S.W.2d 930
(Tex. 1991).
33. Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. 1992); see also Koepp v.
Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 833 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. 1992) (reiterating principle that "just sanctions
must not be excessive").
1993]
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nical mistakes that are correctable without legal prejudice to any party or to
the public interest. 34
As significantly, in an apparent effort to simplify Texas charge practice
and to eliminate reversal of cases that have been fairly, although perhaps not
perfectly tried, the court has backed away from a rigid adherence to the
broadest interpretation of Rule 227's 35 mandatory broad-form submission
requirement.3 6 This "reinterpretation" has taken two distinct forms during
this Survey period. First, the court has recognized that broad-form submis-
sion may not be feasible in multiple theory cases when the governing law is
unsettled. In Westgate, Ltd. v. State37 an inverse condemnation case in
which a landowner alleged two alternative legal theories in support of a
claim for compensation, the court determined that a bad faith claim was not
included in the jury charge because its submission was not requested. 38 Pro-
vocatively, the court noted the following problem with respect to the inclu-
sion of multiple theories in one broad-form jury submission:
Westgate could have requested jury instructions on bad faith and negli-
gence. Although we adhere to the principles of broad-form submission,
see Texas Department of Human Services v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649(Tex. 1990), Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 is not absolute; it mandates broad-form
submission "whenever feasible." Submitting alternative liability stan-
dards when the governing law is unsettled might very well be a situation
where broad-form submission is not feasible. 39
Similarly, other decisions handed down during this Survey period suggest
that reversal may be required when a broad-form submission allows a jury to
decide the case on the basis of an insupportable legal theory.40 Second, the
court has held that the failure to submit a broad-form question does not
amount to harmful error when the questions fairly submit to the jury the
disputed issues of fact and incorporate a correct legal standard.4' These two
developments may ultimately lead to a more manageable body of law con-
34. City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 828 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tex. 1992); see also Crown
Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Gonzalez, 820 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1991) ("decisions ... [should] turn
on substance rather than procedural technicality").
35. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
36. See Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990) ("Rule 277
mandates broad-form submissions "whenever feasible," that is, in any or every instance in
which it is capable of being accomplished.").
37. 843 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. 1992).
38. Id. at 287.
39. Id. at 287 n.6.
40. See, e.g., State Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp. v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 236(Tex. 1992) (special defect theory); Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 267 (Tex. 1992)
(negligent activity theory); Religious of the Sacred Heart of Tex. v. Houston, 836 S.W.2d 606,
607 (Tex. 1992) (substitute facilities doctrine).
41. H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Warner, 845 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tex. 1992) (premises liability
submission); see also Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d at 268 (concurring opinion, even if
plaintiff had properly objected to granulated premise liability questions, error would not have
required reversal). But see Westgate, Ltd. v. State of Tex., 843 S.W.2d 448, 457 (Tex. 1992)
(submission of before and after taking values in two questions was harmful because "the differ-
ence in the before and after values found by the jury ... was within the permissible range of
damages supported by the evidence, and would have stood as the damages if a broad-form of
question had been given").
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cerning the charge than Texas practictioners have enjoyed at any time dur-
ing this century.
Another welcome development in Texas procedural law concerns the
Texas Supreme Court's adoption of the Second Restatement of Judgment's
transactional analysis approach to the doctrine of res judicata. Until this
Survey period, Texas courts resorted to a variety of theories and tests to give
res judicata a somewhat unpredictable application. 42 However, in 1992, the
Texas Supreme Court embraced the "transactional" approach to the subject
of claim preclusion by holding that a subsequent suit will be barred if it
arises out of the same subject matter of a previous action and through the
exercise of diligence, could have been litigated in a prior suit.4 3
After conducting an examination of its prior precedent on the subject, the
court determined that the traditional Texas' approaches of res judicata were
conflicting, ambiguous and unpredictable. 44 As a result, the court adopted
an approach to the problem under which "[a]ny cause of action which arises
out of [the] same facts should, if practicable, be litigated in the same law-
suit."'45 A determination of what constitutes a "transaction" is to be made
pragmatically "giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are
related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient
trial unit, and whether their treatment as a trial unit conforms to the parties'
expectations or business understanding or usage."'4 6
Although at first blush, the transactional approach also appears to suffer
from vagueness, it is noteworthy that the same type of transactional analysis
is applied under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to resolve questions con-
cerning the permissive joinder of parties, compulsory counterclaims, and
permissible cross-claims between coparties. 47 It is also the approach taken
to the subject of claim preclusion by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit. 48
Business and commercial law developments during the Survey period also
reflect a careful consolidation and refinement of earlier developments as well
as a strong tendency to make the substantive law of Texas conform with
national trends.
In its first opinion under the Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act,4 9
the Texas Supreme Court rejected "predatory intent" as a test for predatory
pricing in favor of an objective, economic test that requries, among other
things, the plaintiff to prove the defendant could have reasonably expected
the marketplace to permit a subsequent recoupment of the losses incurred
42. See William v. Dorsaneo, 5 TEXAS LITIGATION GUIDE § 131.07 (1992).
43. Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992).
44. Id. at 630.
45. Id.
46. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(2); Barr, 837 S.W.2d at 631.
47. TEX. R. Civ. P. 40, 97; see also Jack H. Brown & Co. v. Northwest Sign Co., 718
S.W.2d 397 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, writ refd n.r.e.) (applying Texas Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 97).
48. See Kemp v. Birmingham News Co., 608 F.2d 1049, 1052 (5th Cir. 1979).




from pricing blow costs.50 This decision was influenced strongly by federal
case law in an effort "to harmonize our interpretation with federal law to the
extent it is consistent with the purpose of the Texas Antitrust Act."' 5'
In another important decision involving the Business and Commerce
Code, 52 the court concluded that a partnership separation provision under
which a former partner was liable in damages for soliciting or furnishing
accounting services to partnership clients for twenty-four months after sepa-
ration, should be analyzed by the same general principles as covenants not to
compete in order to be enforceable. 53 This conclusion was also based on a
careful consideration of the treatment of similar damages provisions in other
jurisdictions. 54 After deciding that the separation provision was an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade because it applied to clients who first became cli-
ents after the defendant left the firm or with whom the defendant had no
contact at the firm, 55 the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that it was
entitled to equitable modification and enforcement of the provision in ac-
cordance with the Covenant Not to Compete Act. 56 The court rejected this
argument because Section 15.51(c) expressly provides that damages are not
available for breach of a covenant "before its reformation." '57
The other commercial law cases decided during the Survey period that
will have a significant impact on Texas commercial law concern the negotia-
bility of variable interest rate notes and the duties of secured creditors. In a
decision that clearly changed Texas law, the Texas Supreme Court held that
variable interest rate notes are fully negotiable under Texas law if the rate is
"published," i.e., if the rate could be determined by any interested person,
including inquiry at the financial institution that established the rate.58
Although this decision does not embrace the result reached by the majority
of the courts that have addressed the issue, the opinion again reflects a very
careful study of the entire problem and the court's attempt to have Texas
law conform with "modern commercial practices." 59
Texas commercial law has also been advanced by two Texas Supreme
Court decisions dealing with the rights and obligations of secured creditors.
The Texas Supreme Court held that Section 9.503 of the Texas Business &
Commerce Code imposes a non-delegable duty on a secured party to avoid a
breach of the peace in the repossession of collateral. 60 Under this decision,
secured creditors cannot avoid liability for breach of the peace by hiring
50. Caller-Times Publishing Co. v. Triad Communications, Inc., 826 S.W.2d 576, 588
(Tex. 1992).
51. Id. at 581.
52. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 15.50-15.51 (Vernon 1991) (the "Covenant Not to
Compete Act").
53. Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 385-88 (Tex. 1991).
54. Id. at 385.
55. Id. at 387-88.
56. Id. at 388.
57. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51(c) (Vernon 1991).
58. Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 831 S.W.2d 793, 797-98 (Tex. 1992).
59. Id. at 796.
60. MBank El Paso v. Sanchez, 836 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1992).
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independent contractors to effect repossession. 61
Finally, in an important procedural case, the Texas Supreme Court re-
solved the controversy about the allocation of the burden of pleading and
proof when a secured creditor sues for a deficiency following the reposses-
sion and resale of collateral under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code. 62 The court held that a creditor could generally plead that the resale
was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner and need not prove
these allegations unless the debtor affirmatively alleged improper disposi-
tion. 63 If the creditor specifically pleads commercially reasonable resale, the
creditor automatically assumes the burden of proving the allegations.6 In
the opinion, the court acknowledged that no particular rule was "right," but
that a clear rule was beneficial to both parties in litigation about a
deficiency. 65
As in other years, Texas appellate courts have been productively going
about the business of deciding concrete controversies in a professional man-
ner. Much can be learned by carefully surveying their work. This Survey
edition, like its predecessors is a valuable resource tool that will facilitate the
rendition of high quality legal services.
61. Id.
62. Greathouse v. Charter Nat'l Bank-Southwest, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1017 (July 1, 1992).
63. Id. at 1020.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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